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The financing of health care and family planning programs has become a matter of international concern as national budgets for social services have been reduceu while demands on those services have increased (Abel-Smith, 1985; Arellano, 1987; and Cornia et al., 1988) . Cost pressures grew with the oil crisis of the 1970s and the debt crisis of the 1980s, and foreign aid from developed colntcies has declined in real value. Where public funds are diminishing, concern ham been raised as to the source of support for "Health for All by the Year 2000" and for family planning programs--either as part of or separate from the health sector. This concern has led to suggestions that user fees be instituted or increased--at least for those who are able to pay, that communities play a greater role in providing services, and that the private sactor be more involved in the provision of services (World Bank, 1987) .
However, where family planning is concerned, issues other than cost are involved. The threat of rapid population growth is so great in some countries that economic rewards are offered to encourage couples to have fewer children or to adopt contraception or sterilization. Other countries consider it a basic human right--akin to the right to health care--to have the number and spacing of children desired, and they provide contraceptives free to enable people to enjoy that right.
Thus, a variety of monetary policies regarding contraception exists around the world. These range from high user charges in some countries, to free contraceptives in many, to incentives and disincentives in others. This paper examines these policies, focuses on charges and payments as they existed in early 1988, looks at the consistency of monetary policies within countries, and considers the ethical issues raised by each kind of incentive.
The data in this paper come principally from a 1987 questionnaire inquiry to the 100 developing countries having populations over one million. At the time of this writing, responses were in from 65 countries, with most nonresponses concentrated in the countries with the least programmatic activity, chiefly in Africa and the Middle East. A large amo'int of secondary data has been used to supplement the survey, including information from a historical series created by Nortman (1985 and prior yecrs) , beginning in 1969 and containing data through 1983. Nortman's data have never been computerized or aggregated into a si wle time series; we have done that and have combined it with another h cal series for sterilization information (Ross et al., 1985) . Our qu:-stionnaire updates both series for 1984 onward and adds a few additional variables.
A xology
Since considerable confusion exists in defining cost measures, we begin with a basic typology. The distinctions made here are observed throughout the paper.
First, payments are made to: (a) acceptors, (b) providers, and (c) recruiters, all focused on the act of accepting a method (usually sterilization). These payments may be in cash or in kind and are usually given immediately upon acceptance. They vary in amount, and on this variation rests much controversy. A small payment merely replaces out-of-pocket costs and thereby removes a barrier, whereas a large payment can be a strong inducement to an act that would otherwise not have occurred or would have occurred later. In between is an ambiguous zone, complicated by the fact that a fixed payment may be trivial to some but significant to others. Payments, when small and trivial, are not properly termed incentives. Some payments and gifts. on the other hand, have clearly been large enough to act as true incentives, and have been intended to do so.
A second category is the opposite of the first--charges to the client for contraceptive supplies and services. Subtypes exist according to whether the context is a public program, a social marketing scheme, or the commercial sector.
Third are "community incentives"--inducements offered to units small eno-ugh to have a sense of group identification. These are directee,
for example, at a mothers' club, a village, or a local administrative area--again, one small enough to possess the basic sense of community. Some incentives involve rewards only to the group, such as a new well or irrigation system; others offer rewards to individuals but are still given under community auspices and influence. Such measures take various forms and have occurred mainly in pilot projects, although China and Indonesia have implemented them on a national scale.
A fourth type of cost measure consists of incentives and disincentives directed at the general population (as distinct from small groups). These are oriented directly to fewer births, as distinct from inducements to practice contraception. Some involve benefits (or penalties) tied to the nth child: salary level, tax exemptions, maternity leaves, eligibility for preferred housing, schools, and so forth. These have been used chiefly in Asia, but tax and maternity measures appear to a surprising extent in other regions as well.
Public Programs
Depending upon the country and the method, the person adopting contraception through a family planning program may have to pay for it, may get it free, or may receive a paymentl from the program.
Most programs about which we have information provide methods free, especially in Africa, as shown in the middle column of Table 1 . While most African countxies with public programs probably do give contraceptives free, many of the program efforts are weak and their coverage is limited.
Other programs charge the acceptor (column 1), though usually a small amount.
Still others pay the acceptor. In Asia, six programs pay the acceptor for sterilization (column 3), even though they charge for other methods or give them free. Bangladesh also pays IUD acceptors, as does India. We know of no program that pays the acceptor for any other methods.
How consistent are countries in thcir charges or payments for the various methods? Many, in fact, treat different contraceptive methods differently. Although come policies appear inconsistent and highly varied on the surface, they may reflect conscious policy decisions. For example, a country that wants to encourage sterilization might offer incentives for the procedure and, at the same time, provide other contraceptives free of charge or even at a small cost. Some inconsistencies, however, have no apparent rationale.
Countries that are consistent in that they offer all methods free (to the extent that they provide them at all) include Chad, Ethiopia, the Ghana government has felt that it cannot afford to give free ssrvices, and so has instituted small charges for contraceptives and minor health commodities. On the other hand Thailand removed charges for oral contraceptives, largely to help meet its demographic targets.
What are the amounts involved, for charges or payments to acceptors? As seen in Figure 1 , the pill is provided either free or at a price up to US$.60 equivalent, and is almost always sold for well below the commercial price in the same country. Higher charges for oral contraceptives are made in Ethiopia and the more economically advanced Asian economies of Hong Kong, Taiwan (province of China), and Singapore. For the IUD, as seen in Figure 2 , the highest charges occur in Jordan, Singapore, 
Provider Pavments
Some programs also pay the provider a per-case fee, which may encourage higher acceptance rates. The regional pattern for provider payments appears in Table 2 .
The African countries all fall into the first column, making no per-case payments at all. On the other hand, some Asian countries do make such payments, and they do so to all categories of family planning We turn now to the charges for contraceptive supplies in non-program settings. Charges within three contexts were mentioned at the outset: public programs (covered in the preceding section), social marketing plans, and the commercial sector. The latter two now follow.
Social Harleting Plans
We included in our questionnaire a few items on social marketing programs, 2 and obtained estimates of prices from that and from other sources. The results appear in Table 3 . It should be borne in mind that the programs vary greatly in character and in their manner of subsidizing contraceptive products. Some channel products chiefly to private doctors, others to retailers. Some use nonprofit agencies and others only the purely commercial sector. The plan of Taiwan (province of China) works only through factories; in Colombia (not shown) one plan involved sales to private doctors, through orders by mail.
Large differences in price also exist for the same contraceptive method, even within the same country. Two-and three-fold differences within countries appear for the condom in Bangladesh. Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Mexico, and large differences exist in the price of orals, as well.
Across countries the variation is even greater--for example, from US$.08 to US$5.16 for E dozen condoms, and from US$.1l to US$1.26 for one cycle of the pill. Some of these variations reflect quality differences, as with condoms; some reflect product procurement from different sources--for example, international versus local manufacturers; and some reflect a variety of other causes.
The Commercial Sector
We now turn to commercial prices, paid in the marketplace for resupply methods, oi paid to private doctors for sterilization or the IUD.
(Minimum prices are used in this discussion to avoid the complexity of dealing with ranges, and because the mass of poor consumers will usually gravitate to the low price. The figures that follow use the only price given when a country did not report a range.)
The These differences no doubt reflect duty charges, high prices due to scarcity, and othler factors. In Africa, of course, costs to the consumer relative to the Pverage income are comparatively greater than in those Asian countries where per capita income is much higher.
To summarize, these data furnish new informatioa on the costs of contraceptives in public family planning programs, in social marketing programs, and in the commercial (private) sector. They also cover the payments made for contraceptive adoption to both clients and providers.
There are very large differences among countries, and very different forces that govern the decisions of how much to charge, or pay, for different methods.
Community Incentives
Community incentives are intended to create a sense of social responsibility within the group to practice family planning. In both China and Indonesia local government units have been given goals and offered benefits or prizes for the best performance records. In China the local employment unit bears most of the responsibility for making the promised payments to one-child families. In Indonesia loan funds have been given to acceptor clubs to manage; loans can go to any community member but club members manage the fund and so gain prestige. In India several states have offered awards to village councils. The awards range from cash to a bag of cement for each vasectomy performed. In 1983 the Indian government announced an expanded program of benefits to community groups, manufacturers, and labor unions to reward contraceptive performance. In 1983 the Bangladesh government announced that it would begin to give cash awards to districts that achieved family planning goals (but these may never have been implemented, and in any case districts are too large to possess a sense of community).
A recent community incentives pilot program in Thailand tied family planning incentives to a village revolving loan fund (Weeden et al., 1986) . In this plan, the villages received a US$2,500 loan fund; family planning users were allowed to apply for larger loans than nonusers, shares in the fund's profits from interest were larger for those who used more effective family planning methods, and additional grants to the village were predicated upon an increase in contraceptive prevalence.
Incentives and Disincentives for Small Families
Incentives to have small families go beyond a one-time payment for adopting sterilization or an IUD. The objective is not to remove barriers to contraceptive acceptance or to induce people to accept a specific method, but, rather, to create the motivation to limic family size by providing advantages to families who have few children and/or punishments to those who exceed a specified number.
This approach is used most extensively in China and the smaller states of East Asia. In Singapore, the first three children get a choice of schools and, until recently, parents having two children or less got priority for government flats. In China, where the government is promoting the one-child family, benefits are the largest and most varied, and they differ considerably from province to province. In general, children in one-child families receive priority in health care and in admission to schools, and their parents are eligible for improved housing, better jobs, an additional monthly stipend, more land, and eventually higher pensions.
In Indonesia a generous monthly rice allowance is given to every government employee for every family member, but only through the third or fourth child. In the Republic of Korea, families with two or fewer children receive preference for medical care and public housing, and older people who have only two children receive higher pensions. (In addition, as mentioned above, payments are made to low-income people who choose to become sterilized.)
A great deal of ingenuity has been shown in devising ways to benefit parents of small families. For exa&ple, in India in the early 1970s, a no-birth bonus scheme was devised for workers on the tea estates.
A payment was made into a savings account for each month of nonpregnancy.
The account was redeemable, with 5 percent compound interest, at the end of the woman's childbearing ysars. However, 50 to 100 rupees were to be forfeited if the woman had a third child, 250 if she had a fourth child, and the entire account cancelled on the birth of a fifth child (Ridker, 1971) .
Similarly, in a small pilot trial in Taiwan (province of China), families with two or fewer children had money set aside that was later redeemable for the education of their children. Of course one of the problems with long-term benefits is that they require couples to plan for the future and have confidence that the government or business will deliver on its promises, and this can rarely be assured.
Disincentives
A number of countries, particularly in Asia, have imposed penalties on families with more children than the established norm. In China, provinces have used disincentives on families that have more than one child, though we understand that these have applied only to those who signed the one child pledge. Among these disincentives are loss of health benefits, reduced priority in school, and return of benefits previously A relatively common disincentive is to limit the number of tax deductions for children. Kenya, for example, nermits tax deductions only for the first four children. Tax deductions for children have been completely eliminated ir Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania. Some countries--for example, Cameroon--that pay child allowances limit them to a certain number of children. For example, Tunisia gives a family allowance to parents only for the first three children. Similarly, at least eight countries--including Ghana, Singapore, Republic of Korea, and Thailand--limit maternity leaves to a specified number of births.
Ethical Considerations
Payments and incentives to encourage contraceptive use and small families raise a number of ethical issues. We therefore reexamine here each category of measures defined at the outset to consider its ethical features. First, however, some general remarks are needed as background. In these cases "motivation" can easily lead to a "hard sell" approach, with diminished regard for informed consent or voluntarism. Per-case payments can be of particular concern where targets for health personnel or recruiters are established and inlividuals not meeting their targets are penalized.
Community Incentives
Insofar as they benefit communi-ties, providing needed funds for development attivities without putting undue pressure on individuals, community incentives can be viewed as relatively nonrestrictive of personal freedom. However, when community members or their leaders apply strong pressure on individuals to have fewer children or to practice contraception so that the community will be eligible for a reward, then these incentives can restrict free choice. Disincentives may also come into play; it would be unfortunate, for example, if a government were to withhold basic services as a punishment for low-performing communities. Thus, community measures may contain the seeds of coercion, and safeguards must be considered. It should be noted, however, that peer pressures flowing from the group consensus are the cultural norm in many Asian societies and may not be considered coercive by members of the community themselves.
Incentives for Small Families
In some cases, such as the long-term bond schemes practiced on the tea plantations of India or the educational bond experiment in Taiwan Countries employing the latter type of incentives have decided that the costs are offset by savings through reduced maternity and abortion care, fewer children to educate, and so forth, as well as other benefits to the society.
Critics of incentives and disincentives have not claimed that such approaches fail to yield net economic returns or that they fail to work. Incentive Score Changes Over Time. Lapham and Mauldin (1984, 1985) measured the use of incentives, without regard as to the amount, as one of the 30 scores they developed to assess the strength of program effort. This score ranged from 0 to 4 depending upon the number of parties who received a payment or other benefit linked to contraceptive acceptance: the client, any service personnel, the recruiter, or the community, and with extra credit for any disincentive that encouraged family planning or the small family. These scores were for the reference year 1982, and we have calculated comparable scores for 1987.
As regards the losses and gains over this five-year period, overall the movement is upward, with 11 countries increasing their score, and only two decreasing. The upward movement is sharpest in Asia, where 7 of 13 responding countries reported some strengthening as compared to only 4 of the 21 countries in the rest of the world.
Nineteen countries had scores of 0 in 1982; 15 of these remained at 0, and the other four moved only slightly upward. Thus there is stability at the bottom. There is also stability among the few countries or economies at the top: of the three high-scoring ones in 1982, with scores of 3 or more, one moved fAurther upward (Bangladesh) and two (Indonesia and Taiwan, province of China) remained the same. Furthermore, four countries moved sharply upward from lower levels: Korea, Pakistan, Liberia, and China, with Korea and China moving to the maximum score of 4.
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